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RIGHTS AND MODERN SLAVERY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES AND 
CORPORATIONS IN RELATION TO FORCED LABOUR IN GLOBAL SUPPLY 
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Rose Ireland* 
 
Abstract: Despite slavery being criminalised globally, modern slavery is widespread, 
affecting nearly every country in the world. Forced labour within corporate global supply 
chains is a particularly elusive form of modern slavery that has seldom been addressed until 
recent years. The risk of forced labour occurring in global supply chains is exacerbated by the 
‘governance gap’ in which multinational corporations operate. This article will critically 
analyse the application of an international soft law instrument established to address this gap 
– the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘UNGP’) – to the 
issue of forced labour within corporate global supply chains. It will evaluate the potential of 
each of the three ‘pillars’ outlined in the UNGPs in combating forced labour and examine 
practical examples of efforts made by states and corporations to address forced labour that 
amount to implementation of the UNGPs, drawing on practice in the United States and the 
United Kingdom in particular. It will be concluded that the UNGPs are a valuable weapon in 
the fight against modern slavery, but that effective implementation will be challenging. A 
multi-pronged approach is required, mobilising state and corporate actors and incorporating 
both voluntary and mandatory measures that are mutually reinforcing. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, corporate power and transnational economic activity has increased 
alongside international trends towards globalisation, privatisation and deregulation.1 Today, 
corporate supply chains are no longer limited to firms and facilities based in one country. 
Instead, they are comprised of multiple contractor factories dispersed worldwide,2 with 
multinational corporations (‘MNC’) outsourcing production to developing countries in order 
to reduce operational costs.3 As the supply chains of MNCs have become more extensive, 
they have also become more complex and opaque.4 This is problematic not least because the 
influence and reach of MNCs means that they can affect virtually all human rights anywhere 																																																								
* LLB Law 2014 (Bristol); LLM Human Rights Law 2016 (Edinburgh). I am grateful to Dr Kasey McCall for 
her supervision on the original version of this article as a dissertation at the University of Edinburgh. 
1 Aoife Nolan, ‘Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-state Actors through the Role of the 
State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the ‘Obligation to Protect’’ (2009) 9(2) H R L Rev 225, 226. 
2 David J Doorey, ‘The Transparent Supply Chain: from Resistance to Implementation at Nike and Levi-
Strauss’ (2011) 103(4) J Business Ethics 587, 591. 
3 Justine Nolan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Soft Law or Not Law?’ in Surya Deva 
and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect? (Cambridge University Press 2013) 138, 152. 
4 Sophia Eckert, ‘The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act: Fighting Forced Labor in 
Complex Global Supply Chains’ (2013) 12(2) J Intl Business L 383, 386. 
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in the world.5 Moreover, while MNC activity has rapidly evolved, the legal framework 
governing MNCs has trailed behind, creating a ‘governance gap’ in which global supply 
chains operate.6 A number of soft law instruments have emerged to address this gap,7 the 
most recent and authoritative of which is the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (‘UNGPs’),8 which operationalise the 2008 Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework.9  
 The ‘governance gap’, coupled with the trends that have facilitated the expansion of 
corporate power, have also facilitated the growth of modern slavery in the form of forced 
labour in economic activities.10 Forced labour within corporate global supply chains is a 
particularly elusive form of modern slavery that has seldom been addressed until recent 
years.11 The right to be free from slavery is a fundamental human right enshrined in 
numerous international instruments,12 and the prohibition of slavery is considered to be jus 
cogens,13 erga omnes,14 and a norm of customary international law.15 Modern slavery can 
also entail egregious violations of a broad catalogue of multiple human rights16 and have 
destructive social, economic and political consequences.17 Thus, forced labour in corporate 
supply chains is a major human rights issue. 
 This article will critically analyse the application of the three pillars in the UNGPs to 
the issue of forced labour within corporate global supply chains. Section B will evaluate the 																																																								
5 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 paras 2, 6. 
6 ibid paras 3, 13, 104. 
7 Mette Andersen and Tage Skjoett-Larsen, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains’ (2009) 
14(2) Supply Chain Management: An Intl J 75, 82.  
8 United Nations, United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (United Nations 2011) (UNGPs). 
9 UNHRC (n 5). 
10 Benjamin Thomas Greer and Jeffrey Purvis, ‘Corporate Supply Chain Transparency: California’s Seminal 
Attempt to Discourage Forced Labour’ (2016) 20(1) Intl J Human Rights 55, 60. 
11 Caroline Robinson, ‘Claiming Space for Labour Rights within the United Kingdom Modern Slavery Crusade’ 
(2015) 5 Anti-Trafficking Rev 129, 131. 
12 Eg Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 
4; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 8; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) [1950] (ECHR) art 4; Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/02, art 5; American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 
Costa Rica) (22 November 1969) OAS Treaty Series No 36 (ACHR), art 6. 
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331, art 53; International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries’ 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol. II (1966) Un Doc A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1 248. 
14 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 13, [34]. 
15 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (2001) ICTY, IT-96–23-T and IT-96–23/1-T [520]. 
16 Eg ICCPR arts 7, 9; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) art 7. 
17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and 
Action (United Nations, 2008) 4.   
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potential of each of the pillars in combating forced labour. Section C will examine practical 
examples of efforts made to address forced labour that amount to implementation of the 
UNGPs. It will draw from practice in the United States (‘US’) and the United Kingdom 
(‘UK’) in particular, since these governments are amongst those taking the most action 
against slavery and have numerous MNCs incorporated or operating within them.18 It will be 
concluded that the UNGPs are a valuable weapon in the fight against modern slavery, but that 
effective implementation will be challenging. A multi-pronged approach is required, 
mobilising state and corporate actors and incorporating both voluntary and mandatory 
measures that are mutually reinforcing.19  
2. Background 
a) Modern slavery 
Despite slavery being criminalised globally,20 modern slavery – ‘a complex manifestation of 
the global economy, organized crime and human rights violations’ – is widespread, affecting 
nearly every country in the world.21 There are numerous international instruments that 
address slavery22 and modern slavery.23 Modern slavery is a contentious term and the 
alternative terminology of ‘trafficking in persons’ is commonly invoked in international 
instruments.24 In essence, both modern slavery and ‘trafficking in persons’ are umbrella terms 
for the disparate, but related, offences of slavery, forced labour, domestic servitude and 
human trafficking.25 Modern slavery is vast in scope, taking varied forms that serve a range 
of exploitative purposes.26  
																																																								
18 Global Slavery Index, The Global Slavery Index 2016 (Global Slavery Index, 2016) 5. 
19 Greer and Purvis (n 10) 57. 
20  International Labour Organization, ILO 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Executive Summary 
(International Labour Organization, 2012) 4. 
21 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014 (United 
Nations 2014) 1. 
22 Eg Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade (signed 8 February 1815) 63 CTS 473; 
Slavery Convention (adopted 25 September 1926, entered into force 9 March 1927) 60 LNTS 253 (Slavery 
Convention). 
23 Eg Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 
(adopted 2 December 1949, entered into force 25 July 1951) 96 UNTS 271; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000) (Trafficking Protocol); UN General 
Assembly, Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Resolution (adopted 10 November 2000) 
A/RES/55/25; International Labour Organization, Forced Labour Convention (adopted 28 June 1930, entered 
into force 1 May 1931) ILO No. 29; International Labour Organization, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 
(adopted 25 June 1957, entered into force 17 January 1959) (ILO No. 105); International Labour Organization, 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (adopted 18 June 1998). 
24 Jason Haynes, ‘The Modern Slavery Act (2015): A Legislative Commentary’ (2016) 37(1) Stat L R 33, 35. 
25 ibid. See Trafficking Protocol art 3(a). 
26 ibid. 
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The ILO predicts that out of the 20.9 million victims of modern slavery globally, 14.2 
million are victims of forced labour.27 Forced labour ‘refers to situations in which persons are 
coerced to work through the use of violence or intimidation, or by more subtle means’,28 for 
the purpose of economic exploitation and production.29 To amount to modern slavery 
working conditions must be characterised by coercion, control, restrictions on liberty and 
severe violations to human rights and dignity.30 It can occur at any stage in the supply chain 
and affects virtually all industries, including but not limited to agriculture, aquaculture, 
construction and fashion.31 
3. The protect, respect and remedy framework and the UNGPs 
The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework was established in 2008.32 It rests on three 
‘differentiated but complementary’ pillars: the State duty to protect against human rights 
abuses by corporations, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the need for 
greater access to effective remedy for victims.33 The 2011 UNGPs retain the pillars and 
introduce a number of principles designed to operationalise – ‘that is, to provide concrete and 
practical recommendations for … implementation’ – the Framework, applicable to all states 
and business enterprises.34 Each pillar is underpinned by differing legal and policy bases, but 
they form a ‘coherent whole’.35 Both the UNGPs and the Framework were formulated by the 
Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, and were unanimously endorsed by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council.36 The UNGPs are soft law: they clarify and elaborate upon 
the pre-existing responsibilities of states and corporations and do not change any existing 
legal obligations or create new ones.37 Ruggie argues that since individual actions by states 
and corporations are limited in what they can achieve, concerted efforts are required by states 																																																								
27 ILO (n 20) 1. 
28 International Labour Organisation, ‘The Meanings of Forced Labour’ (International Labour Organization 
2014) <www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/news/WCMS_237569/lang--en/index.htm%202012> accessed 
13 July 2017. 
29  Stefan Gold, Alexander Trautrims and Zoe Trodd, ‘Modern Slavery Challenges to Supply Chain 
Management’ (2015) 20(5) Supply Chain Management: An Intl J 485, 487. 
30 Anna Shavers, ‘Human Trafficking, The Rule of Law, and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2012) 9(1) South 
Carolina J Intl L Business 39, 76. 
31 ILO (n 20) 1. 
32 UNHRC (n 5). 
33 ibid para 9. 
34 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 para 9. 
35 UNGPs (n 8) 1. 
36 UNHRC ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (6 July 2011) 
A/HRC/RES/17/4; UNHRC ‘Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (18 June 2008) A/HRC/RES/8/7 
37 UNGPs (n 8) 1. 
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and corporations.38 The UNGPs aim to bridge the governance gap by providing, for the first 
time, a specific focal point from which actors’ expectations can converge and develop.39 The 
UNGPs are widely supported; this may partially be due to the widespread consultations 
Ruggie conducted with stakeholders in developing the UNGPs.40 
 
B. THE PILLARS 
This section will outline each pillar and assess their potential, both individually and 
collectively, in the context of their application to forced labour. To a certain extent, the pillars 
resemble the ‘3Ps’ approach to tackling modern slavery advanced by the United Nations: 
protecting victims, preventing modern slavery, and prosecuting perpetrators.41   
1. State duty to protect 
According to the UNGPs, states have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by 
corporations within their territory or jurisdiction.42 This duty is grounded in recognition of the 
existing legal obligations to which states are subject under international human rights law.43 
All states have ratified at least one of the major international human rights law treaties.44 
Under these treaties, states have both positive obligations to protect against human rights 
abuses by non-state actors and negative obligations to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of human rights;45 duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.46 The 
European Court of Human Rights has affirmed that the right to be free from slavery imposes 
a duty on states to regulate entities that engage in slavery, including corporations.47 This is 
important since forced labour is predominantly perpetrated by private, not state, actors. Thus, 
the ‘protect’ pillar encompasses forced labour.  
																																																								
38 UNHRC (n 5) para 17. 
39 UNHRC (n 34) para 5. 
40 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law’ (2009) 87(2) J 
Business Ethics 385, 385–386. 
41  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Human Trafficking’ (UNODC, 2017) 
<www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html?ref=menuside> accessed 13 July 
2017. 
42 UNGPs (n 8) 3. 
43 ibid 1. 
44 McCorquodale (n 40) 386. 
45 Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. para 6; Case of X and Y v The 
Netherlands App no 8978/80 (ECHR, 26 March 1985) [23]; Case of Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil, Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights Series C No 149 (4 July 2006) [85]. 
46 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food 
(art11)’ (12 May 1999) E/C.12/1999/5 para 15. 
47 Case of Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (ECHR, 26 July 2005) [89], [112]; Case of Rantsev v Cyprus and 
Russia App no 25965/04 (ECHR, 7 January 2010) [283]–[289].  
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 Corporate abuses are not generally directly attributable to states under international 
law.48 Where forced labour occurs within corporate supply chains, the state is not directly 
responsible for the abuse itself, but might be responsible for enabling the corporation to act as 
it did by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent, investigate and punish forced labour 
and provide redress for victims.49 The duty to protect is a standard of conduct, not result.50 In 
human rights discourse, this standard is known as due diligence,51 but this terminology is not 
adopted in the UNGPs in relation to the state duty. The duty is neither absolute nor unlimited 
and the actions required to satisfy the standard will vary according to a number of factors, 
giving states discretion in deciding what measures to adopt.52 Appropriate steps for forced 
labour would include, at a minimum, the enactment and enforcement of a regulatory regime 
addressing corporate complicity in forced labour, punishment for non-compliance, and 
increasing remedies for victims.53 This is supported by international treaties addressing 
modern slavery which require, inter alia, that all forms of modern slavery are criminalised.54  
 In formulating policies addressing corporate-related human rights harms, the UNGPs 
emphasise the need for states to strive for policy coherence: ensuring that other laws ‘do not 
constrain but enable business respect for human rights’.55 States often segregate or heavily 
discount business and human rights policies from other policy domains that influence 
business activity.56 A common criticism of state efforts to tackle forced labour is that they are 
too narrow and fail to rectify the broader socioeconomic conditions that cause it in the first 
place.57 For example, low protection for migrants and low-skilled workers make these groups 
more vulnerable and can undermine policy efforts to tackle forced labour.58 Modern slavery 
is a multi-dimensional issue involving a range of policy realms and legal fields, such as, 
migration, employment and company law. Coherence in state policy is critical to combating 
forced labour. 
																																																								
48 Anne T Gallagher, The International Law of Human Trafficking (Cambridge University Press 2010) 235–236.  
49 UNGPs (n 8) 3; See HRC (n 45) para 8; Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, 
Materials, Commentary (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 479. 
50 John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) AJIL 22.  
51 Eg Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 4 (29 July 
1988) [172]. 
52 Knox (n 50) 23; Case of Osman v the United Kingdom App no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 Oct 1998) [116]. 
53 Siliadin (n 47) [89], [112]; Rantsev (n 47) [283]–[289]. 
54 Trafficking Protocol art 5. 
55 UNGPs (n 8) 4; UNHRC (n 5) para 33. 
56 UNHRC (n 5) para 22. 
57 Stephen J New, ‘Modern Slavery and the Supply Chain: the Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility?’ 
(2015) 20(6) Supply Chain Management: An Intl J 697, 701. 
58 Robinson (n 11) 133. 
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 To fulfil their duty to protect, states must encourage corporate nationals to respect 
human rights ‘throughout their operations’,59 both within and outside their territories.60 The 
potential extraterritorial reach of the state duty to protect is important in addressing forced 
labour due to its transnational nature. The UNGPs emphasise the importance of home state 
(where MNCs are incorporated) regulation for human rights protection.61 This is largely 
because host states (where MNCs’ suppliers are based) in developing countries often lack the 
resources and institutional capacity of home states.62 Host states may also be incentivised to 
relax regulatory standards to attract foreign investment and increase revenues by being less 
burdensome for MNCs.63 Conversely, host states may be prevented from strengthening 
human rights protections due to bilateral investment agreements.64 This contributes to the 
‘governance gap’ which exacerbates the risk of forced labour. The UNGPs highlight that 
home states could help bridge that gap. 
 Home states in developed countries are well-positioned to apply pressure on MNCs 
within their jurisdiction to tackle forced labour.65 There is no consensus, however, on whether 
the international human rights law obligations of states extend to the extraterritorial activities 
of corporate nationals, and if so, whether and in what circumstances home states can exercise 
and enforce their jurisdiction abroad.66 These debates are outside the scope of this article. 
Suffice to say the UNGPs assert that while it is unclear whether states are legally obliged to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of corporate nationals, they are not prohibited from 
doing so provided they have a ‘recognised jurisdictional basis’.67 Even if jurisdiction can be 
established, however, home states face a number of practical hurdles in enforcing their 
																																																								
59 UNGPs (n 8) 13. 
60  Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70(4) MLR 598, 599; 
Oxfam, Business and Human Rights: An Oxfam Perspective on the UN Guiding Principles (Oxfam, 2013) 
<www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tb-business-human-rights-oxfam-perspective-un-guiding-
principles-130613-en.pdf> accessed 13 July 2017, 6. 
61 Andreas Rühmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, Private Law and Global Supply Chains (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2015) 232. 
62 UNHRC (n 5) para 14; Katerina Peterkova Mitkidis, ‘Sustainability Clauses in International Supply Chain 
Contracts: Regulation, Enforceability and Effects of Ethical Requirements’ (2014) 1 Nordic J Commercial L 1, 
3. 
63 Nicholas Connolly, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Duplicitous Distraction?’ (2012) 16(8) Intl J Human 
Rights 1228, 1229. 
64 UNHRC (n 5) para 34; Steven R Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ 
(2001) 111(3) Yale L J 443, 535. 
65 McCorquodale and Simons (n 60) 600. 
66 UNHRC (n 5) para 19; Louise Vytopil, ‘Contractual Control and Labour-Related CSR Norms in the Supply 
Chain: Dutch Best Practices’ (2012) 8(1) Utrecht L Rev 155, 156. 
67 UNGPs (n 8) 3–4. 
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jurisdiction in another state’s territory.68 These hurdles are exacerbated by theories of 
corporate law which separate top-tier corporations’ liability from those of their supply chain 
firms. Thus, the capability of home states to regulate modern slavery occurring within the 
supply chains of its corporate nationals has some promise but is also inherently limited. This 
affirms Ruggie’s assertion that to meet the human rights challenges posed by MNCs, ‘the 
active participation of business’ is also required.69 
2. Corporate responsibility to respect 
The UNGPs state that corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights.70 This 
responsibility applies to all corporations in respect of all ‘internationally recognized human 
rights’.71 Such rights are violated by forced labour, thus this pillar encompasses forced labour. 
The terminology ‘responsibility’ and ‘duty’ distinguishes the nature of corporate and state 
obligations.72 Although the content of this pillar is defined by reference to legal instruments, 
unlike the state duty to protect this pillar is not grounded in law. Rather, it articulates the 
‘baseline expectation for all companies in all situations’ as part of a company’s ‘social 
licence to operate’.73 The UNGPs simply express a norm which was already emerging, 
partially as a result of the proliferation of voluntary international and private instruments 
asserting that businesses should adhere to human rights standards.74 
 The decision to ground this pillar in social expectations is consistent with the 
traditional view that international law imposes duties only on states, not on private actors.75 
This approach has been widely endorsed by both states and corporations.76 Some scholars, 
however, criticise it for being too ‘soft’, arguing that corporations should be subject to 
binding international human rights law.77 These arguments are outside the scope of this 
article. As things stand, corporations are not duty-bearers under international human rights 
law and the UNGPs do not seek to change that position.78 Thus, international law does not 
																																																								
68 McCorquodale (n 40) 389. 
69 UNHRC (n 5) para 50. 
70 UNGPs (n 8) 13. 
71 ibid. 
72 Björn Fasterling and Geert Demuijnck, ‘Human Rights in the Void? Due Diligence in the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2013) 116(4) J Business Ethics 799, 800.  
73 UNHRC (n 5) paras 24, 54; UNGPs (n 8) 13. 
74 Erika R George and Scarlet R Smith, ‘In Good Company: How Corporate Social Responsibility Can Protect 
Rights and Aid Efforts to End Child Sex Trafficking and Modern Slavery’ (2013) 46(1) New York University J 
Intl L Politics 55, 82. 
75 Nolan (n 3) 146. 
76 Connolly (n 63) 1231. 
77 Wesley Cragg, ‘Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social Contract’ (2000) 27(1) J 
Business Ethics 205, 213; Nolan (n 3) 139. 
78 McCorquodale (n 40) 391. 
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impose a direct duty on corporations not to engage in slavery.79 This forms another aspect of 
the ‘governance gap’: despite their international presence, the legal responsibilities of MNCs 
in relation to human rights are defined by national law.80 The corporate responsibility to 
respect, therefore, is closely linked to the state duty to protect since to fulfil their own 
international obligations, states must enact laws at the domestic level which enforce corporate 
responsibility for human rights abuses.81 
 The corporate responsibility to respect is not merely a passive responsibility of non-
interference but encompasses avoiding complicity in abuses committed by other actors.82 It 
entails three modes of corporate responsibility:83 first, for directly causing human rights 
abuses through its own activities; 84  second, for contributing to human rights abuses 
committed by other actors;85 and third, for having direct links to adverse human rights 
impacts, including through its supply chain regardless of whether the corporation has 
contributed to the abuse.86 It follows that the responsibility to respect will be engaged when 
MNCs cause, contribute to, or have direct links through their supply chain with modern 
slavery. The latter two refer to complicity, a concept with both legal and non-legal 
meanings.87 Contributing to forced labour may engage legal and non-legal complicity, while 
connections to forced labour are more likely to give rise only to non-legal complicity.88  
National law may provide for criminal or civil liability where corporations are complicit in 
the commission of forced labour, for example, through aiding and abetting. This relates to the 
third pillar, access to redress, and states approaches in this regard will be explored further in 
section C.  
 As a non-legal matter, MNCs may be perceived by the public as complicit in forced 
labour that occurs within their supply chains simply through their connection to it and the 
benefits they derive from it, regardless of actual legal liability.89 Indeed, as a result of 																																																								
79 Knox (n 50) 29. 
80 ibid 30. 
81 Kasey L McCall-Smith, ‘Tides of Change – the State, Business and the Human’ in Richard Barnes and 
Vassillis Tzevelekos (eds), Beyond Responsibility to Protect: Generating Change in International Law 
(Intersentia 2016) 219, 226. 
82 UNHRC (n 5) para 73; UNHRC, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprise (15 May 2008), UN Doc 
A/HRC/8/16 para 26. 
83 Amol Mehra and Katie Shay, ‘Corporate Responsibility for Modern Forms of Slavery’ (2016) 14 JICJ 453, 
457. 
84 UNGPs (n 8) 14. 
85 ibid. 
86 ibid. 
87 UNGPs (n 8) 18. 
88 UNHRC (n 82) para 41. 
89 ibid para 27. 
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advances in technology and heightened awareness of the connection between business and 
human rights, MNCs are increasingly held accountable by the public where forced labour is 
detected in their supply chains.90 Causing or being complicit in forced labour can have 
negative consequences for corporations, including divestment, reputational damage and a fall 
in share prices.91 Thus, the responsibility to respect can be ‘socially’ enforced through the 
‘courts of public opinion’.92 Coupled with potential for litigation in national courts, forced 
labour presents a significant risk to MNCs, creating a viable ‘business case’ for corporations 
to prevent and redress it.93 Indeed, MNCs can derive a number of reputational benefits from 
combating forced labour, enabling them to attract socially conscious consumers and 
investors.94  
 To avoid complicity, corporations should exercise due diligence ‘to become aware of, 
prevent and address’ human rights abuses with which they are directly or indirectly involved 
through their activities or business relationships.95 The concept of due diligence is central to 
this pillar. It is a term familiar to human rights law in relation to state duties regarding non-
state actors, and to business practices in relation to the management of financial risks.96 The 
precise scope of human rights due diligence varies according to context.97 At a minimum, it 
should include embedding a publicly-available policy throughout the business enterprise, 
including supply chains; ongoing assessment of ‘actual and potential human rights impacts’; 
integrating and acting upon the findings; tracking human rights performance and compliance 
through monitoring and auditing; communicating results internally and externally; and a 
remediation process where human rights abuses have already occurred.98  Since due diligence 
requires corporations to take proactive steps to monitor and influence their global supply 
chains, it could be an important tool for identifying and tackling forced labour. 
 The responsibility to respect exists separately from and in addition to a corporation’s 
obligation to comply with national laws and a state’s ability or willingness to protect against 
																																																								
90 See eg Annie Kelly, ‘Hitachi and Canon not doing enough to tackle forced labour, says new report’ The 
Guardian (23 June 2016) <www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/jun/23/hitachi-canon-ict-
companies-forced-labour-supply-chain-benchmark-report> accessed 13 July 2017. 
91 UNHRC (n 5) para 75; E. Christopher Johnson, ‘The Corporate Law, Human Trafficking, and Child Labor: 
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human rights violations.99 Thus, MNCs have a responsibility to adhere to international 
standards, regardless of whether those standards are effectively enforced in the different 
national contexts in which they operate.100 This means that poor human rights and worker 
protections in host states do not exculpate corporations. MNCs are often well-placed to tackle 
forced labour due to their resources, power and influence enabling them to control and 
pressurise suppliers.101 This is central to closing the ‘governance gap’ and increasing human 
rights protection. It also compensates for the limitations of some states and failure of others to 
adequately fulfil their duty to protect.102   
 As part of their responsibility to respect, corporations must strive for policy 
coherence.103 There is a tendency for corporations, like states, to isolate their human rights 
policies from the policies that govern their wider activities, sometimes leading to policy 
incoherence and contradictory behaviour.104 This is particularly relevant to forced labour. The 
demanding purchasing and production practices of corporations, which seek a fast turnaround, 
often increase the likelihood of exploitative working conditions.105 An OXFAM study on 
Unilever, for example, found that although Unilever had a human rights due diligence policy, 
its purchasing practices had an adverse impact on workers since they imposed challenging 
requirements on suppliers.106 Corporations are often reluctant to review how their purchasing 
practices may contribute to modern slavery.107  Yet, modern slavery is not simply an 
exogenous aberration which corporations have to manage, but a structural problem generated 
by the broader economic conditions constituted in part by corporations themselves.108 
Structural problems require structural solutions109 that address the root of the problem as well 
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as ‘isolated problems factory by factory’.110 Thus, integrating and embedding human rights 
policies throughout corporate operations is essential to tackling forced labour. 
3. Access to remedies 
The final pillar recognises that victims of corporate-related human rights harm need access to 
remedies and grievance mechanisms.111 This is important to both the state duty to protect and 
the corporate responsibility to respect.112 Grievance mechanisms can be defined as the varied 
processes ‘through which grievances concerning business-related human rights abuse can be 
raised and remedy can be sought’.113 They may take a range of substantive forms and be 
judicial or non-judicial; state-based or non-state based.114 They not only provide redress for 
victims, but also function as ‘bottom up’ tools that complement ‘top down’ mechanisms to 
increase corporate accountability. 115  Procedurally, they should always be impartial, 
corruption-free and independent.116 In many countries access to effective judicial and non-
judicial redress for victims of business-related harm is limited.117 This is especially true for 
victims of forced labour, notwithstanding the many injustices they suffer.  
 When business-related human rights harm occurs within a state’s territory or 
jurisdiction, states must ensure that victims are aware of and have access to effective 
remedies.118 This encompasses investigating, punishing, and redressing the harm.119 Like the 
state duty to protect, this aspect of the remedy pillar is grounded in the existing obligations to 
which states are subject under international human rights law: access to justice is a human 
right.120 States have discretion in choosing remedies, but should adopt appropriate judicial, 
administrative and legislative mechanisms. 121  Human rights treaty bodies increasingly 
recommend that states establish criminal and civil corporate liability for human rights abuses 
that fall within their jurisdiction.122 Establishing liability is arguably the most appropriate 
form of state-based redress for corporations complicit in forced labour. On an international 
level, modern slavery is a criminal offence and should be recognised as such in domestic law 
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to ensure adequate punishment and accountability.123 It can also amount to a range of civil 
wrongs and, accordingly, corporate defendants should be liable for damages resulting from 
the harm suffered by victims. 
 Judicial mechanisms must be accessible and effective.124 States must proactively 
consider ways to reduce legal and practical barriers to access to remedy, including for foreign 
plaintiffs against corporations based or operating in their territory.125 Foreign plaintiffs may 
seek to claim against MNCs in home states when they are unable to secure adequate redress 
from suppliers in host states where the harms occurred because of, inter alia, the insufficient 
resources of the supplier or weak domestic law.126 The UNGPs highlight three key legal 
barriers to such claims that are all relevant to forced labour. Firstly, victims may be prevented 
from seeking remedy from MNCs in home states because of jurisdictional issues and forum 
non conveniens.127 Secondly, company law doctrines, such as separate legal personality, 
coupled with the limited legal recognition of corporate groups as single economic entities, 
mean that top-tier MNCs and their suppliers are viewed as autonomous and separate.128 The 
‘corporate veil’ means MNCs are not generally liable for wrongs committed within their 
supply chains, regardless of the realities of economic control.129 This allows corporations to 
structure their activities to avoid liability for claims arising out of forced labour within their 
supply chain. Finally, in some states certain groups, such as indigenous persons and migrants, 
are excluded from some types of legal protection, making them especially vulnerable to 
forced labour.130 Practical and procedural barriers include the costs of bringing cases and 
difficulty in securing legal representation.131 
 This pillar also encompasses non-state based grievance mechanisms, which are 
expected to meet certain criteria.132 Corporations should ensure that victims of human rights 
harm have access to remedies through establishing effective operational-level grievance 
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mechanisms as part of their socially-grounded responsibility to respect.133 States have a duty 
to facilitate access to non-state based grievance mechanisms.134 These types of mechanisms 
could provide remedies for forced labour victims in circumstances when courts cannot 
provide effective remediation.135 Forced labour does not need to occur before it is brought to 
the attention of MNCs; MNCs could be alerted to concerns about severe working 
conditions.136 This could assist MNCs with their human rights due diligence processes and 
facilitate the early identification of modern slavery, thereby preventing it from escalating.137  
 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
When it comes to implementation of the UNGPs ‘one size does not fit all’ and different 
approaches can be, and have been, adopted for different human rights abuses.138 This section 
will analyse the effectiveness of three key techniques used to address forced labour. Some of 
these predated the UNGPs but nevertheless serve as examples of how the UNGPs can be 
implemented. 
1. Transparency and reporting 
State efforts to regulate forced labour in corporate supply chains have predominantly taken 
the form of increasing transparency by mandating corporations to publicly disclose their 
modern slavery policies. The US California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010139 
(‘CTSCA’) and the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015140 (‘MSA’) require large corporations that 
meet a certain threshold to publish reports on their websites that disclose the steps they take, 
if any, to monitor and manage modern slavery within their supply chains.141 If a corporation 
has taken no steps, it must issue a statement to that effect.142 Rather than requiring specific 
information to be disclosed, both Acts instead provide a non-exhaustive list of examples, 
such as, risk assessments; supplier codes of conduct; audits; training and internal 
accountability procedures; and certification by suppliers.143 In effect, the CTSCA and MSA 
require corporations to disclose the extent to which they exercise human rights due diligence 
to address forced labour. This approach complements a more general trend of legislative 																																																								
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reporting which requires MNCs to report on the social and environmental impact of their 
global operations.144 Although this legislation does not exclusively address forced labour, the 
resultant reports can encompass it.145 
 The CTSCA and MSA are relatively broad in scope; they apply to any corporation 
which conducts business in California and the UK respectively, regardless of where it is 
incorporated.146 Furthermore, by mandating reporting requirements which extend to corporate 
supply chains regardless of where the suppliers are based, this type of legislation has 
extraterritorial reach and helps bridge the ‘governance gap’. It enhances governmental 
oversight of global supply chains and to some extent overcomes the jurisdictional hurdles to 
tackling forced labour faced by states outlined in the previous chapter. In both the CTSCA 
and MSA, however, it is unclear how far down the supply chain the reporting requirements 
extend.147  The CTSCA emphasises the ‘direct supply chain’, suggesting the requirements 
apply primarily to corporations’ direct suppliers.148 The MSA appears to be broader and 
encompass the whole supply chain, though this has been challenged by some 
commentators.149 This is problematic since forced labour tends to occur further down supply 
chains.150 
 By increasing transparency and public scrutiny of MNCs’ forced labour policies, the 
MSA and CTSCA indirectly encourage corporations to exercise due diligence. This indirect 
approach is endorsed by the UNGPs.151 It amounts to implementation of the state duty to 
protect, by strengthening the corporate responsibility to respect at the domestic level. The 
resulting reports make it easier for NGOs, the media and the public to ‘shame’ corporations 
and hold them to account.152 Increased transparency also allows consumers and investors to 
make more informed decisions, preventing them from inadvertently supporting forced 
labour.153 Theoretically, this should incentivise corporations to exercise due diligence to 
address forced labour; otherwise, they may lose consumer approval, market share and 
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competiveness.154 Thus, this legislation leverages market and societal pressures rather than 
legal liability.155 It could also reduce consumer-based demand for cheap goods and services – 
a major part of the problem - where these are tainted by slavery.156 MNC involvement in 
forced labour is sometimes a result of their ‘willful blindness’157 and the complexity and 
opaqueness of contemporary supply chains rendering forced labour hidden.158 Encouraging 
corporations to educate themselves about their supply chains and to increase transparency is 
vital to uncovering forced labour.159   
 For the MSA and CTSCA to be effective, social actors need to engage with the 
information made available.160 There are numerous examples of high-profile instances where 
exposure of modern slavery in global supply chains has been traced back to MNCs, such as 
Nike and Nestlé.161 Many respond by voluntarily enhancing their human rights due diligence 
policies and publishing extensive supply chain disclosures to restore their reputations.162 
Societal pressure can also trigger collective change. For example, in response to pressure 
from workers in Florida, MNCs including Subway and Burger King committed to the Fair 
Food Program which aims to eliminate forced labour in the tomato industry.163 Public 
pressure also led to fish from a Thai supplier associated with forced labour being removed 
from supermarkets across Europe and the US.164 Market and societal forces, therefore, can be 
powerful.  
 On the other hand, the impact of these forces varies between industry sectors. Social 
pressure is stronger and brand recognition is more valuable to MNCs in industries that 
specialise in consumer rather than industrial goods.165 Additionally, while the MSA applies to 
corporations that provide goods and services, the CTSCA is limited to corporations that 
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produce tangible goods.166 This is problematic since, although the risk of modern slavery is 
greater in certain industries, it is not confined to them, occurring across the global economy. 
Moreover, although the number of ethical shareholders, investors and consumers are growing, 
they remain a minority.167 In short, there is no guarantee that disclosure will have any 
consequences at all.168   
 Research suggests that companies have responded positively to the CTSCA and 
imposed new requirements on their suppliers.169 Other research indicates, however, that 
corporate responses are varied, with some producing detailed reports while others simply 
reproduce the language of the statute or state that they are not taking any measures.170 
Similarly, a study of the first one hundred MSA statements found them to lack meaningful 
detail.171 Some scholars argue that these inconsistencies are a result of the vague formulation 
of the disclosure requirements in both statutes172 which enable corporations to make ‘empty, 
airy statements that mean nothing’.173 In any case, some argue, in absence of a requirement 
for independent third-party verification, reports may simply amount to corporate 
‘greenwashing’.174 Worse still, corporations that expose themselves to public scrutiny by 
providing detailed reports in good faith may be disadvantaged in comparison to their 
competitors and consequently this might discourage transparency.175 This suggests that to 
make the reports more uniform, reliable and transparent, the disclosure requirements need to 
be made more specific and third-party verification made mandatory.  
An alternative approach advocated by some scholars is to make full supply chain 
disclosure mandatory for MNCs.176 This would result in greater transparency which would 
further empower NGOs and the media to hold MNCs accountable and thus encourage 
corporations to better monitor working practices within their supply chain.177 Some MNCs 
argue, however, that it is impractical because supply chains are constantly changing and it 
amounts to confidential commercial information.178 Doorey dismisses the latter argument on 																																																								
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the basis that some MNCs, like Nike and Levi, have already disclosed their factory lists.179 
MNCs could also establish long-term business relationships with suppliers to make the 
disclosure requirements more manageable.180 It could provide opportunities for collaboration 
between MNCs that use the same suppliers, strengthening their compliance mechanisms and 
increasing efficiency by reducing duplication of monitoring.181 Ultimately, however, this 
approach suffers from the same shortcomings of other transparency measures that rely on 
public opinion. Overall, tackling modern slavery requires more than reporting and 
transparency requirements. While this legislation can lead to some improvements by 
increasing societal and market pressures, its impact is always likely to be indirect and 
somewhat limited.  
 Neither the CTSCA nor the MSA require corporations to exercise due diligence.  
Under the Acts, corporations must simply report what, if anything, they have voluntarily done 
to address forced labour.182 Corporations are not penalised for failing to exercise due 
diligence. New argues that this legislation lacks ‘teeth’ and by deploying corporations to 
regulate themselves and their suppliers, it provides only a limited role for the home and host 
state in monitoring corporate activity.183 On this interpretation, reporting and transparency 
legislation is insufficient to fulfil the state duty to protect, fails to address the remedy pillar 
and may be another manifestation of state reluctance to directly regulate corporate activity. 
Some scholars argue that to meet the duty to protect, states must monitor corporate activity 
and harden the corporate responsibility to respect at the domestic level by obliging MNCs to 
carry out human rights due diligence, rather than rely on corporate self-regulation.184 On the 
other hand, Eckert argues that in light of the size and number of MNCs and the limited 
resources of states, reliance upon corporate self-regulation makes the governance of corporate 
supply chains ‘practically feasible’.185 Imposing legally binding requirements on MNCs in 
relation to their entire supply chain may be unrealistic given their fluid and rapidly changing 
nature.186   
2. Corporate codes of conduct and due diligence policies 
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In recent decades, growing numbers of MNCs have adopted codes of conduct that extend to 
their suppliers in response to increased concerns about the social environmental impacts of 
their supply chain and to the rising prominence of Corporate Social Responsibility187 (‘CSR’). 
CSR refers to ‘the integration of social, environmental, and economic concerns into business 
operations’.188 It is distinctive from, though related to, the business and human rights agenda. 
Although these codes are voluntary in nature, they create behavioural expectations.189 Since 
the UNGPs were published the number of codes has increased and many now refer to the 
UNGPs.190 By enabling corporations ‘to identify, prevent, mitigate and plan to redress human 
rights abuses’, these codes can amount to the exercise of due diligence in fulfilment of the 
corporate responsibility to respect.191 The content of these codes varies and they tend to 
address a range of issues, but the majority pinpoint labour issues as a primary concern.192 
 Codes of conduct have long been adopted by corporations and many are accompanied 
by well-established procedures to monitor and enforce supplier compliance.193 Individual 
MNCs adopt varied procedures but Mitkidis summarises the general approach as having three 
elements: preventive monitoring, relational enforcement and contract termination. 194 
Preventive monitoring entails detecting non-compliance and is usually carried out through 
auditing. Faced with non-compliance, corporations can choose either to engage or disengage 
with the supplier.195 Disengagement (contract termination) is not generally favoured as it 
does not aim to change supplier behaviour and improve working conditions.196 Best practice 
is considered to be engagement through relational enforcement. On this approach, top-tier 
MNCs engage in long-term relationships with suppliers to address non-compliance, helping 
them to improve as part a ‘continuous development process’.197 Contractual termination is 
used only as a last resort.198 																																																								
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 This leads to the question of whether traditional procedures adopted to enforce codes 
of conduct can be effective in tackling forced labour. There is some evidence that codes have 
raised business awareness of forced labour and improved working conditions in global supply 
chains.199 Since the codes are widely adopted, they may gradually standardise corporate 
respect of human rights and the elimination of forced labour in supply chains, triggering a 
‘race to the top’.200 They also provide a standard from which an individual corporation’s 
human rights performance can be judged, enabling social actors to ‘name and shame’ 
corporations who fail to meet their own stated commitments.201 Despite these potential 
benefits, businesses continue to cause or contribute to forced labour.202 Gaps between the 
standards expressed in codes and the working conditions within supply chains are 
common.203 This suggests that the current mechanisms used for enforcing codes are not 
effective in tackling forced labour. 
 A number of issues arise with the application of traditional due diligence policies to 
forced labour. Auditing tends to detect only immediately visible issues.204 Moreover, because 
forced labour is a criminal activity, it is often actively hidden by perpetrators, making it 
difficult to detect compared to other CSR issues.205 Auditors may struggle to get full access to 
facilities and victims are often unwilling to discuss their circumstances with them.206 The 
complexity of global supply chains further conceals victims, particularly since forced labour 
tends to occur in the lower-tiers of supply chains which are inherently the most challenging to 
monitor.207 Hence, the majority of MNCs only monitor direct, first-tier suppliers.208 In short, 
conventional auditing and monitoring processes may be inadequate for detecting forced 
labour. Hence, forced labour has been discovered in the supply chains of MNCs with well-
developed CSR regimes.209 Additionally, when it is detected, its illegality arguably also 
removes engagement as an option, since knowing engagement could expose MNCs to 
criminal liability.210 Conversely, contract termination and the withdrawal of sourcing from 
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host states following the detection of forced labour might actually have negative 
socioeconomic implications and exacerbate the risk of forced labour within countries.211 
 For human rights due diligence to be effective in tackling forced labour, it must go 
beyond basic auditing and extend to the lower-tiers of supply chains. This is challenging 
given the difficulties in controlling extensive supply chains comprised of firms in different 
social, political and geographical settings,212 some of whom MNCs may have no direct legal 
relationship.213 There are, however, ways of trying to overcome these challenges. For 
example, ‘supply chain mapping’ - the process through which high-risk areas of the supply 
chain are identified and prioritised for human rights due diligence – is endorsed in the 
UNGPs.214 Operational-based grievance mechanisms might also counteract the shortcomings 
of auditing by providing a ‘bottom up’ route through which modern slavery can be detected. 
Corporations could also collaborate where they use the same facilities. 215  Ultimately, 
however, this will require significant resources.216 This may be more feasible for larger 
MNCs than small-to-medium size corporations.217 Indeed, some argue that since corporations 
cannot feasibly control their entire supply chain, it is too much to expect all corporations to 
exercise due diligence in relation to it.218 Ruggie highlights, however, that the scope of due 
diligence is not unlimited and takes into account differences between MNCs.219 Corporations 
are not expected to exercise due diligence in relation to every entity over which they have 
some influence, but strategically to avoid being a ‘causal agent’ or complicit in human rights 
harms.220 
 The resources and efforts necessary for MNCs to conduct effective due diligence to 
address forced labour nevertheless remains problematic. The perpetration of forced labour is 
motivated by profit.221  In most jurisdictions, the primary function of corporations is to 
maximise shareholder value and directors have fiduciary duties to this end.222 Forced labour 
poses reputational and litigious risks to MNCs which can have an adverse impact on their 																																																								
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share value. Thus, it is possible to construct a ‘business case’ for eliminating forced labour 
from supply chains aligned with the profit maximization goal. Statistics suggest, however, 
that in practice only a minority of MNCs view forced labour as a credible threat.223 
Furthermore, although direct perpetrators of forced labour retain the bulk the profits derived 
from the crime,224 it can still increase corporate profits through lower labour costs.225 
Sourcing labour from suppliers in host states with adequate human rights standards and 
conducting effective due diligence may increase production costs.226 Thus, the elimination of 
forced labour may conflict with the goal of profit maximization. Directors have a legal 
obligation to maximise profits but not a legal obligation to combat forced labour. In many 
ways, therefore, the prevailing legal framework governing MNCs can be counterproductive 
to the elimination of forced labour. 
 This illuminates a fundamental difference between the CSR and human rights. CSR is 
ultimately ‘bottom-line focused’: it is designed to encompass social and environmental 
considerations in order to assist a corporation’s business while having a broader positive 
impact on society.227 In CSR terms, forced labour is one amongst a number of social risks to 
be taken into account by corporations when assessing what is in the best financial interests of 
shareholders. Human rights, on the other hand, are ‘person centred’ and designed to vest 
individuals with universal rights and entitlements.228 In human rights terms, individuals have 
a right to be free from slavery and forced labour must always be prohibited. CSR codes are 
usually viewed as encompassing human rights,229 but this conflation of CSR and human 
rights is problematic and may impede the effectiveness of human rights due diligence. The 
UNGPs appear to partially acknowledge this distinction; they highlight that human rights 
impact assessments can be incorporated in existing CSR procedures but should explicitly 
refer to human rights.230 They also state that corporations should assess risks to rights-holders 
as well as risks to the company.231 Bang argues that to combat forced labour, corporations 
need to implement due diligence not only for their own benefit, but also for the benefit of 
victims.232 Corporate practice is yet to shift in this direction. It is questionable whether such a 																																																								
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shift, or even a better balance, can be achieved under a legal framework which prioritises 
shareholder interests and profit maximisation. 
 One solution may be to modify the fiduciary duties of directors to encompass a duty 
to exercise due diligence to address forced labour. Indeed, some states have passed legislation 
reframing the fiduciary duties of directors to encompass broader social and environmental 
considerations. Section 172 of the UK’s Companies Act 2006, for example, adopts an 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach which retains the profit maximisation goal, but 
instructs directors to consider non-financial, social and environmental considerations.233 The 
effectiveness of this ‘enlightened’ approach is, however, contested.234 Muchlinski argues that 
human rights due diligence requires going beyond an ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
approach to encompass social and financial concerns on a more equal standing.235 In the 
context of forced labour, although section 172 suggests that it is something directors have a 
duty to consider, the interests of shareholders remain paramount. Some, like Connolly, argue 
that diluting the profit maximization goal with other compulsory non-financial considerations 
may actually be counterproductive, since it would leave greater scope for ‘individuals to 
subvert the system for their own ends’.236 A better approach, he suggests, would be to retain 
shareholder primacy but to ‘rig the system’ through regulation that makes human rights 
violations unprofitable.237 
 As it stands, human rights due diligence is voluntary. In keeping with the profit 
maximisation paradigm, the corporations that seem to have been most proactive in tackling 
forced labour are those who view it as a threat to their profitability.238 They seem to have 
acted primarily in response to market and social pressures and the potential financial losses 
inaction can bring, rather than as a matter of principle.239 This underlines both the potential 
value of transparency and reporting measures in increasing the reputational and profitability 
risks to corporations and their limitations: as indicated in the previous section, the impact of 
the ‘court of public opinion’ is uneven and inconsistent. Mehra and Shay argue that 
increasing the prospect of legal liability and thus financial penalties could incentivise MNCs 
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to combat forced labour, regardless of their sector or size.240 This could also reinforce the 
corporate responsibility to respect at the domestic level. 
3. Criminal and civil liability 
A growing minority of states are establishing corporate liability for breaches of national laws 
which reflect international standards.241 This links to all three pillars: states fulfil their duty to 
protect by increasing access to remedies for victims of corporate-related abuses and 
strengthening the corporate responsibility to respect by creating accountability. If states fail 
to establish corporate liability for forced labour, they may be in breach of their obligations 
under international law.242 
a) Criminal liability 
Historic slavery has long been criminalised and since the Trafficking Protocol more than 90% 
of countries have criminalised modern slavery. 243  International criminal tribunals only 
assume jurisdiction over natural persons, thereby excluding corporations.244 However, under 
international law, states are obliged to punish perpetrators of forced labour, including 
corporations.245 Thus, states are increasingly extending domestic criminal law to encompass 
corporate activity.246 Corporations may be criminally liable for forced labour perpetrators or 
through complicity.247 Theories imputing liability to corporations for complicity vary, but 
domestic criminal law is often influenced by international criminal law.248 Applying these 
rules to forced labour, MNCs may be considered to have aided and abetted where they 
knowingly provide assistance or encouragement, through act or omission, which has a 
substantial effect on the commission of forced labour by suppliers.249  
 In the US, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000 (‘TVPA’) makes human 
trafficking and related offences a federal crime.250 The Act has since been expanded, making 
it a criminal act to knowingly benefit from modern slavery.251 This goes further than 																																																								
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international criminal law, under which merely benefiting from the abuse is unlikely to be 
sufficient to establish complicity.252 Some states in the US have also extended corporate 
liability in state law to forced labour within their supply chains.253 The UK MSA establishes 
new offences of modern slavery, including forced labour, and imposes harsh penalties on 
‘persons’ that commit them.254 It is unclear from the wording of the Act whether this extends 
to corporations, but the House of Lords has suggested that it includes legal persons.255 
 Criminal liability addresses corporate human rights impunity and creates 
accountability. Despite some positive legislative developments, however, globally the 
number of convictions for forced labour is low.256 The majority of prosecutions are against 
individuals, not corporations.257 This is in part because it is difficult to attribute knowledge or 
intent to corporations and thus establish the mens rea required for criminal conviction.258  As 
a result, corporate executives tend to be more vulnerable to criminal liability than the 
corporation itself. The example of the UK Bribery Act suggests that holding corporate 
executives criminally liable for forced labour might make them take compliance within their 
global supply chains more seriously.259 Establishing a similar form of extraterritorial liability 
to bribery was considered, but dismissed, in the preparatory stages of the MSA.260 
b) Civil liability 
The most common approach to seeking judicial redress from corporations remains civil 
litigation.261 Forced labour can give rise to a range of civil wrongs, such as negligence, 
assault, battery, trespass to the person and false imprisonment.262 The two most important 
types of claims in this context have been statutory causes for action and conventional 
common law torts.   
 Victims of forced labour may seek to recover damages from a MNC in its home state 
when they cannot secure remedies from the supplier in the host state where the harm occurred. 
There are two key sets of obstacles to the success of these types of claim: the first are 
jurisdictional; the second derive from the ‘corporate veil’ which shields MNCs from liability 																																																								
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for the activities of its suppliers and subsidiaries.263 In the UK, forum non conveniens is no 
longer an obstacle for cases concerning the extraterritorial activities of UK corporations and 
other EU-domiciled defendants as a result of the Brussels Regulation,264 although the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU has created uncertainty. The courts rarely pierce the ‘corporate veil’ 
in relation to parent-subsidiary corporations and usually only on the basis of fraud.265 They 
have, however, shown a willingness to achieve the same effects of veil-piercing by 
establishing direct liability of a parent company for harm suffered by its subsidiary’s 
employees.266 In the English Court of Appeal case Chandler v Cape Plc, the superior 
knowledge and significant control exercised by a parent company over the health and safety 
policies of its subsidiary meant it had assumed responsibility to protect the employees and 
owed them a direct ‘duty of care’.267 In determining whether a duty of care arose, the court 
stressed the level of control and knowledge the parent company had over its subsidiary’s 
health and safety policies and working conditions.268 
 This kind of liability has yet to be established in the context of a buyer-supplier 
relationship.269 Some scholars argue that parent-subsidiary and buyer-supplier relationships 
are analogous and that this form of liability could thus be extended to the latter, particularly 
where the buyer exercises a ‘high degree of control and involvement … in its suppliers’.270 It 
could be argued that when MNCs require suppliers to commit to codes of conduct which 
prohibit forced labour and monitor compliance, MNCs are assuming responsibility to protect 
the supplier’s employees.271 This argument has yet to be made in the UK courts, but in the 
US a similar argument against Walmart by its supplier’s employees who were subject to, 
inter alia, forced labour by that supplier was rejected by the court.272 Although Walmart had 
a code of conduct which publicly promised that it would monitor supplier compliance with 
labour standards, the court held this reflected a right to inspect, not a duty to inspect.273 In 
Canada, British Colombia’s Supreme Court is to rule on a claim against Nevsun by Nevsun’s 																																																								
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supplier’s employees that were subjected to forced labour on the basis that, inter alia, Nevsun 
owed them a direct duty of care due to its relevant control and knowledge over the 
contractor’s policies.274 While this is promising, overall it is difficult to establish that parent 
companies owe a duty of care to their subsidiary’s employees, let alone to those of their 
suppliers. Moreover, a duty of care is unlikely to arise where MNCs are not involved with 
their suppliers. 
 In the US, statutory civil actions are the most effective route to secure redress from 
corporations. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 2003 makes provision 
for civil causes of action enabling victims to sue corporations engaging in forced labour for 
damages.275 In a recent case under the TVPA, for example, a company was ordered to pay 
$12 million in damages to victims of human trafficking.276 The bulk of jurisprudence 
addressing corporate-related human rights harm has arisen under the Alien Tort Statute 1789 
(‘ATS’).277  The ATS allows aliens to sue for a tort that violated international law in US 
courts.278 These cases almost always concern violations of customary international law.279 
The ATS reaches the conduct of private parties in three situations: where they violated a 
norm of international law that is recognised as extending to private parties without requiring 
state action, including the prohibition against slave trading; where they were acting under the 
‘color of law’ or state authority; and where they aided and abetted an international law 
violation.280 The majority of ATS cases with corporate defendants have involved alleged 
complicity.281   
Only a narrow set of sufficiently definite norms fall within the scope of the ATS.282 It 
is well-established that the prohibition of slavery is a norm of customary international law 
and a number of ATS cases have concerned corporate-related forced labour.283 For example, 
Cuban plaintiffs were awarded $80 million in damages in a claim against a corporate 
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defendant for conspiring with the Cuban government in a forced labour scheme.284 Despite 
some successes, however, the question of corporate liability under the ATS is controversial. 
Some argue that international civil jurisdiction cannot extend to corporations on the basis that 
they are excluded from international criminal jurisdiction and are not subjects of customary 
international law.285 There is a circuit split on this issue.286 Some cases concerning forced 
labour have indicated corporate liability is possible,287 while others state corporations are 
immune from liability.288 The Supreme Court is yet to rule on this issue, despite it being 
referred to them in Kiobel.289 Until the Supreme Court does so, it seems it is for states to 
determine whether corporations can incur civil liability based on customary international law 
within the domestic legal order.290  
 The ATS effectively creates a form of extraterritorial civil jurisdiction, though its 
scope has been severely curtailed by Kiobel, where the Supreme Court held that claims had to 
‘touch and concern the territory of the US … with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extra-territorial application’ of US law. 291  This has significant 
implications for victims of forced labour within the global supply chains of US-domiciled 
MNCs. Courts have since taken a mixed approach to cases involving US defendants and 
harms occurring outside the US.292 The general consensus seems to be that some conduct 
relevant to the harm must take place on US territory and mere incorporation in the US is 
insufficient.293 Ultimately, Kiobel makes it unlikely the ATS will be used for abuses that 
occur outside the US.294 For example, Kiobel was recently used to dismiss a case against 
KBR concerning forced labour at a US military facility in Iraq.295  
 Civil claims provide an effective form of monetary redress for victims where they are 
successful or result in settlements.296 However, the chances of successful civil claims against 
MNCs by the employees of suppliers abroad remain low. There are still significant practical 																																																								
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and legal obstacles to holding corporations liable for forced labour occurring within their 
global supply chains. This may stem from the fact that MNCs are not generally legally 
obliged to respect human rights.297 Civil actions can, however, provide a way of holding 
corporations more fully to account for the claims they make in their codes of conduct.298 
While some argue that this might discourage MNCs from establishing voluntary codes of 
conduct and exercising due diligence, as we have seen this overlooks the societal and market 
pressures on MNCs to respect human rights.299 Indeed, it is arguable that the threat of 
litigation can put pressure on corporations fearful of legal liability and bad publicity, 
deterring them from engaging in forced labour and incentivising them to exercise due 
diligence.300 Unsurprisingly, many scholars argue that tort law should be expanded to reflect 
the economic ‘realities of global production’ and to prevent corporations from structuring 
their activities to avoid liability.301 Extending corporate liability to encompass forced labour 
within global supply chains would not necessarily open the ‘floodgates’ to an indeterminate 
number of claims but would create financial and other reasons for corporations to exercise 
due diligence and to abide by their own stated codes of conduct.302 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The scale and severity of forced labour makes it one of the most challenging human rights 
issues facing the world today. Its transnational and multi-dimensional nature means that to 
tackle it, concerted efforts that target its multifarious dimensions are required by both states 
and corporations. States are territorially and jurisdictionally limited, but MNCs are well-
positioned to monitor and influence their supply chains. The three pillars in the UNGPs offer 
much potential, individually and collectively, to tackle forced labour. The biggest challenge 
lies in implementation. Measures to tackle forced labour that amount to implementation of 
the UNGPs utilize market, societal and legal forces to varying degrees in order to encourage 
MNCs to exercise due diligence. Although these are promising developments, these measures 
suffer from a number of shortcomings that derive from the unique challenges forced labour 
poses as well as the inherent limitations of the measures themselves. There is no clear 
solution to these problems, but a multi-pronged approach is certainly required, striking the 
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right balance between mutually reinforcing voluntary and mandatory measures that 
incentivise MNCs to address forced labour. 
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